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CASES NOTED
be necessary and in closing remarked: "We believe that a person has no
right to expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless
and wanton actions on someone else.
' 3 5
The soundness of the decision in the instant case was enhanced by
the analysis of Judge Shannon, who perceptively distinguished those
decisions in which insurance companies have been held liable for puni-
tive damages. He stated:
In these cases, the courts have construed the contracts against
the drafting party and found the wording broad enough to
encompass punitive damages. We base our decision on public
policy, and therefore the question of interpretation is not
reached. 6
It is submitted that Judge Shannon's approach to the problem
settles the question. His reconciliation of Lazenby upon contract grounds
removes Lazenby from a position in direct opposition to the majority.
Such a result clearly comports with both the public policy surrounding
punitive damages and the possibilities of indemnification for those
damages.
BARRY KUTUN
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING
POLICE INTERROGATION
The defendant was arrested in connection with the murder of a store-
keeper. After police investigators interrogated him for several hours at
a police station, he admitted complicity in the murder. He made no request
for the assistance of counsel at any time during police questioning. The
trial court allowed the incriminating statements to be introduced into
evidence over the defendant's objection that such introduction would
result in a denial of due process of law because he was interrogated with-
out benefit of the advice of counsel.' On direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of Florida, held, affirmed: the sixth amendment to the federal
constitution, as made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amend-
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
1. The defendant raised the issue of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion. However, this note will be confined to the sixth amendment right-to-counsel clause as
it applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment because the Supreme Court of the
United States has recently based its holdings in confession cases on that clause rather than
upon consideration of whether a confession can be voluntarily made when a suspect is
not advised of his right to remain silent.
For a cogent argument that the fifth amendment is the only appropriate clause to be
applied to confessions, see Elsen & Enker, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States
& Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 57-58 (1965).
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ment, guarantees an accused person the right to legal counsel in all
criminal prosecutions; however, before a suspect has been formally
charged with a crime-while the investigative processes are still going
on-there is no "criminal prosecution" to which this guarantee can attach.
Montgomery v. State, 176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965).
Most authorities have concluded that "the English common law was
not particularly solicitous of the rights of a criminal defendant .,' In
1695, those accused of treason were granted a statutory right to appointed
counsel,' and in 1836, those accused of a felony were granted the right
to have retained counsel represent them fully at trial.4 The English
"Judges Rules" of 1912 require an arresting officer to advise a suspect
that he has a right not to answer the officer's charge and that any state-
ment he makes may be used against him.5 A statement taken contrary to
the Judges Rules may be admitted into evidence by the trial judge at his
discretion, provided it is voluntarily made.'
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
for the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings.7 However, the Su-
preme Court heard practically no cases arising in the state courts involv-
ing the right to counsel, until 1932.1
In that year the Court concluded in Powell v. Alabama' that the sixth
amendment extends to state criminal proceedings through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment" and that defendants on trial for
a capital crime who are "unable to employ counsel, and incapable
adequately of making [their] own defense because of ignorance, feeble-
2. Beaney, Right to Counsel before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REV. 771, 772 (1961).
See Roberts, J. in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
60-61 (1932); BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 3N AmERICAN COURTS 8-14 (1955).
But see Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1001, 1015-17, 1028-33 (1964). "One thing can be said
with certainty: the right to counsel was ... one of the basic and continuing procedural rights
of criminal defendants in the common law. Not until the sixteenth century . . .was the
right to counsel kept from expanding." Id. at 1032.
3. The Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1.
4. Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1.
5. Hearings on S. 234 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 468-69 (1958).
6. Regina v. Bass, [1953] 1 Q.B. 680, 684. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 n.6
(1964).
7. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
8. Comment, supra note 2, at 1031 n.181.
9. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
10. Id. at 67. The Court rejected the reasoning found in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884) to the effect that where an absolute right as against the federal government is
explicitly stated in the Bill of Rights and not re-expressed in the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, then it must have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution not to
perpetuate such an absolute right against the states. The rule laid down in Hurtado must
yield if the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions .. . .A consideration of the right [to counsel] makes it clear that the
right is of this fundamental character."
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mindedness, illiteracy, or the like [must have counsel at trial] whether
requested or not, . . . as a necessary requisite of due process of law.'''
Subsequently, the appointment of counsel was held to be mandatory in
all state capital cases regardless of accompanying circumstances. 2
In Betts v. Brady," the Supreme Court distinguished Powell and
held that the appointment of counsel at state trials for non-capital crimes
was necessary under the due process clause only if the failure to appoint
counsel "tested by an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a given case
[results in a trial which lacks] fundamental fairness, shocking to the
universal sense of justice . ... ,,4 In constructing this test the Court rea-
soned that the right to counsel is not absolute in state non-capital
proceedings because the sixth amendment is not incorporated into the
due process clause of the fourteenth. 5 This case by case approach is
justified because due process standing alone is a "concept less rigid and
more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights."' 6
The Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 7 overruled Betts and
held that an absolute right to the assistance of counsel exists at state trials
for non-capital crimes because that right is one of "those guarantees of
the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty . . . pro-
tected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' While the Court in Powell limited its holding to the
particular facts and circumstances of that case, "its conclusions about
the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable.'
1 9
An absolute right to appointed counsel exists on direct review of state
criminal convictions. 20 An accused's constitutional right to counsel in-
11. 287 U.S. at 67.
12. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485
(1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
The right to retain counsel at all state criminal trials has been held to be absolute.
Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959) ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) ; Avery v.
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
13. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14. Id. at 462.
15. The Court dismissed the precedents provided in Powell v. Alabama by stating:
"Expressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument [that the right to
counsel at state criminal trials is absolute] but ... none of our decisions squarely adjudicates
the question now presented." Id. at 462-63.
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) where the Court stated that the
decision in Powell "did not turn upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would have been
guaranteed to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment if they had been
prosecuted in a federal court. [It turned upon the fact that in] the particular situation laid
before us in the evidence the benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing."
16. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. Id. at 341.
19. Id. at 343.
20. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Accord, Donald v. State, 154 So.2d 357
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). Compare State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1964) which held that no
absolute right to counsel exists at a hearing on a motion for post-conviction relief.
1965]
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cludes the right to assistance at state pre-trial criminal proceedings, such
as arraignment 2' and preliminary hearing, 22 but only when that stage is
"critical." The right is based upon the sixth amendment and therefore is
absolute and not dependent upon the particular circumstances of each
case.
23
Lisenba v. California24 was the first Supreme Court case in which the
absence of counsel during police interrogation played a prominent role.
The Court treated the denial of counsel at that stage as only a factor to
be considered in determining if a confession is made voluntarily."
The problems inherent in determining the constitutionality of denial
of counsel by police were presented sharply in the case of Crooker v.
California.2" The defendant, a thirty-one year old college graduate with
one year of law school training, was arrested on suspicion of murder. He
confessed to the crime after being interrogated three separate times which
totaled three hours. At the outset of the interrogation he twice requested
to call an attorney but was informed that he could do so only at the end
of the interrogation. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Clark,
first concluded that denial of counsel does not render a confession in-
voluntary per se." The Court then rejected the reasoning of Powell v.
Alabama," and adopted the approach of Betts v. Brady,29 by holding that
because the sixth amendment is not incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and because due process is a concept "less rigid and more
fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of
the Bill of Rights,""a° the right to counsel at police interrogation is not
absolute. Due process alone does not protect an accused from a deprival
of counsel unless "he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent
21. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Cf. Walton v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 28
(1962).
22. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
23. In both Hamilton and White the stage was deemed critical because under the state
procedure involved pleas could be made to the charge. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (dictum). If the stage is critical, any conviction will be held void without the
necessity of the accused showing by particular circumstances that he was prejudiced in any
way by the absence of counsel. Hamilton v. Alabama, supra note 21, at 54; White v. Mary-
land, supra note 22, at 66. Contra, Rash v. State, 162 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) which
was decided before the dictum in Pointer v. State clarified Hamilton and White.
24. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
25. It is well established that fourteenth amendment due process prohibits the use of
involuntary confessions in state criminal prosecutions. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957) (defendant under a disadvantage because of low mentality); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954) (fraud in inducement by questioning officers); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948) (defendant under a disadvantage because of youth); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945) (threats of physical violence); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)
(prolonged and persistent questioning) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (physical
violence).
26. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
27. Id. at 438.
28. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
30. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958).
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trial with an absence of that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice." 1 The Court stated that whether a denial of a request
for counsel will cause a fundamentally unfair result depends on the sum
total of facts and circumstances of each individual case82 and concluded
that the circumstances presented did not in fact result in such fundamental
unfairness.
The United States Supreme Court cases subsequent to Crooker that
have used its test, have not gone so far as to assert that a confession made
to police without the advice of counsel results in fundamental unfairness
in the absence of the more traditional factors which have rendered a
confession inadmissible because it was given involuntarily."
In Massiah v. United States,84 an indicted defendant who had re-
tained counsel made incriminating statements to a confederate who had
agreed to cooperate with the government. The statements were overheard
by a government agent through a hidden radio and used at trial. The
Supreme Court held that the defendant was denied the protection of
the sixth amendment but emphasized that it was dealing with a federal
rather than a state case and limited its holding to the particular circum-
stances involved. However, the Court has recently indicated its willing-
ness to extend the holding in Massiah to cases originating in state courts
when a suspect confesses after indictment."
In Escobedo v. Illinois,86 the Supreme Court reversed a state murder
conviction where the trial court had admitted into evidence the defen-
dant's incriminating statements made during pre-indictment interrogation.
31. Id. at 439.
32. Id. at 440.
33. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
See note 25 supra.
[The Crooker test has been characterized as having merely] solidif[ied] the holding
of the Lizenba case that denial of counsel is one factor in the overall determination
of voluntariness, since it would appear that the circumstances which would have
satisfied the Court's definition of [prejudicial denial of counsel] are circumstances
which probably would have rendered the confessions involuntary. Thus, we are
really back where we started from. Denial of counsel at the interrogation stage is
not per se violative of the Fourteenth Amendment-it is a factor to be considered,
albeit one that may in a given case be decisive. Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police
Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 24, 33 (1960).
Some lower federal courts which have used the Crooker test have treated the denial of
counsel as an issue independent of the voluntariness of the challenged confession. Lee v.
United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Griffith v. Rhay, 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960).
34. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
35. The Court has remanded such a case to the Ohio courts "for consideration in light
of Massiah v. United States." McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964).
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d
349 (1964), has distinguished Massiah on the ground that in McLeod the defendant's state-
ments were made willingly in the known presence of public officers before he had obtained
counsel.
36. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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The police had not advised the defendant of his constitutional right to
remain silent and had denied his repeated requests for an opportunity to
consult with his attorney. The court held that the sixth amendment did
apply to the case and announced a new test for determining when the
right to assistance of counsel has been violated:
When the [interrogation process] shifts from investigatory to
accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is
to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to operate
• ..and the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer.87
However, the court then limited its holding to the facts presented and
distinguished Crooker v. California, on the grounds that the defendant
in Crooker was advised of his right to remain silent and was a well
educated man.88
In the present case, the court distinguished Escobedo on the ground
that the instant defendant did not request to consult with counsel before
confessing. It reasoned that since the Court in Escobedo limited its hold-
ing to the particular facts of that case, the sixth amendment does not
apply until all the circumstances found in Escobedo are present. It then
applied the Crooker test and concluded that the due process clause stand-
ing alone was satisfied because the circumstances showed no lack of
fundamental fairness.
A majority of other courts which have been faced recently with
facts essentially the same as those presented in Montgomery, have used
the same approach as the Florida Supreme Court to limit the impact of
Escobedo."9
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Dorado,40 has determined
that a demand for an attorney is relevant in determining whether the
sixth amendment applies only to the extent that it is evidence that an
interrogation has become accusatory. It found "no strength in an artificial
requirement that a defendant must specifically request counsel; the test
must be a substantive one: whether or not the point of necessary protec-
37. Id. at 492.
38. Id. at 490-92.
39. Davis v. State, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Timmons v. Peyton, 240 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Va. 1965); State v. Winsett, 205 A.2d 510 (Del. 1964); Crum v. State, 172 So.2d 24
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964) ; Sturgis v.
Maryland, 235 Md. 334, 201 A.2d 681 (1964); Cowans v. State, 238 Md. 433, 209 A.2d 552
(Ct. App. 1965); Parker v. Warden, 236 Md. 236, 203 A.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1964); Bean v.
State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Blanchard, 44 N.J. 195, 207 A.2d 681 (1965);
State v. Hodgson, 44 N.J. 151, 207 A.2d 542 (1965); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J. Super. 427,
202 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1964) ; People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852 (Ct. App.
1965).
40. 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), aff'd on rehearing, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398
P.2d 361, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965).
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tion of guidance of counsel has been reached."'" A minority of courts
have followed Dorado.2
By limiting its holding in Escobedo, the United States Supreme
Court has approached the question of right to counsel with the charac-
teristic caution it often displays in areas where serious moral and
pragmatic reasons exist both for and against extending relief to aggrieved
parties. 43 However, because the Court has expressly refuted its limiting
of Powell v. Alabama,44 and impliedly refuted its limiting of Massiah v.
United States,45 it is reasonable to assume that it may also refute its
limiting of the Escobedo test in the near future."' The author submits
that if this occurs, the key circumstances in determining whether the
police have "focused" on the accused in an individual case will be the
weight of the evidence available to the police at any given time4 7 and the
severity of the methods used by interrogating officers.48 Since the arrest
of a defendant is a strong indication that the police have "focused" upon
him, such arrest combined with a single question by an officer may be
deemed sufficient for the sixth amendment to attach.49
The focus test is necessarily hazy as are all tests of fact which
41. Id. at 268, 394 P.2d at 956.
42. United States v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Cruz x. Delgado, 233
F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964); State v. Neely, 398 P.2d 482 (Ore. 1965); Commonwealth v.
Negri, 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965); State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965). See State v.
Hall, 397 P.2d 261, 268 (Idaho 1964) (concurring opinion).
43. Presence of counsel will reduce the number of confessions obtained by police.
Frankfurter, J. in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-87 (1961); Justice Jackson
concurring in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) ; Inbau, More about Public Safety v.
Individual Civil Liberties, J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 329 (1962).
If assignment of counsel is required, the cost may be prohibitive. Elsen & Enker,
Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L.
REV. 47, 78 (1965).
Presence of counsel is necessary because of the critical nature of interrogation. "Any
lawyer who has ever been called into a case after his client has 'told all' . . . knows how
helpless he is to protect his client against the facts . . . disclosed." Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.).
Secret interrogation may lead to police brutality and may create public resentment
against law and government. Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: the Right to
Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24, 66-67 (1960).
Police interrogation undercuts the accusatorial nature of our system of justice. American
justice is based upon the premise that society should prove guilt from evidence independently
secured through skillful investigation. Frankfurter, J. in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54
(1949).
44. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
45. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
46. "Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be
naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the
accused . . . has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation." Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (dissenting opinion of White, J.).
47. See United States v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (Interrogation deemed
accusatory when a co-defendant implicated the defendant in a robbery.)
48. See United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964) (Interrogation found
investigatory when police merely offered defendant an opportunity to explain his presence
at the scene of a crime.)
49. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (dissenting opinion of White, J.).
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depend upon consideration of many circumstances for their determination.
Until a pattern of circumstances sufficient to constitute "accusation"
emerges from future United States Supreme Court decisions, it will be
difficult to predict with any certainty when investigation has shaded into
accusation in any particular case.
MICHAEL J. CAPPUCIO
WHITHER NONSUIT?
The plaintiff moved for nonsuit immediately after the jury had been
impaneled and sworn. The defendant then moved for a judgment with
prejudice against the plaintiff on the ground that the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure provide only for voluntary dismissal of actions, with no
provision for nonsuits. The trial court denied the defendant's motion
and allowed the plaintiff to take a nonsuit, assessing costs against the
plaintiff. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
Florida Rule 1.35(a), as revised in 1962, supersedes Florida's nonsuit
statute,' insofar as the statute permits the taking of a voluntary nonsuit
in any manner inconsistent with the Rule. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the District Court of Appeal.
Crews v. Dobson, 177 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
In the instant case the Florida Supreme Court attempted to deal the
death blow to the common law concept of nonsuit in this state. This was
done on the federal level in 1938, with the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In Florida, however, despite the similarity
of Florida Rule 1.35 to Federal Rule 41,8 the right of the plaintiff to take
a nonsuit until "the Jury retire from the bar,"4 has been zealously pro-
tected. The decision of the supreme court to treat with finality the long-
standing problem of "Florida's unique dismissal"5 calls for a review of
the history and significance of the problem.
Under the common law, as modified by the statute of 2 Hen. IV. c. 7,
a plaintiff had an absolute right to terminate his litigation at any stage of
the proceedings before the verdict was read.' In 1913, the United States
1. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963): "No plaintiff shall take a non-suit on trial unless he do
so before the Jury retire from the bar."
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 41 provides for the voluntary dismissal of actions under specified
circumstances and conditions. On the federal level there is no absolute right of dismissal
after service by an adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment.
3. For a detailed comparison of the effect of the two rules, see Barns and Mattis, 1962
Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U. Mmmi L. REv. 276, 281-87
(1963).
4. FLA. STAT. § 54.09 (1963).
5. Comment, Florida's Unique Dismissal-The Non-suit, 13 U. FLA. L. REv. 105 (1960)
provides an excellent summary of the development and effect of nonsuit in Florida. [Here-
inafter cited as 13 U. FLA. L. REV.)
6. National Broadway Bank v. Lesley, 31 Fla. 56, 12 So. 525 (1893).
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